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² People are di®erent in many ways: Income and Wealth, Education
and Marital Status, and Health Related Behavior and Survival.
² As economists, we want to know whether people di®er in their
decisions through life because di®erent things happen to them or
because they are intrinsically di®erent?
² If the latter, in which dimensions people are di®erent?
² We will exploit data on health outcomes and health investment
to ¯nd out.Pijoan-Mas, R¶ ³os-Rull Penn, CEMFI, www.caerp.com
Health outcomes and economics (educ) are related
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But Marital Stu® Also Matters
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For Females, too















Death 4Pijoan-Mas, R¶ ³os-Rull Penn, CEMFI, www.caerp.com
Health outcomes and economics (educ) are related
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Income also matters (Rogot, Sorlie, Johnson (92))
² At age 25 the lowest income group for males has a life expectancy
of 43.6 the highest, 53.6. For females 54.4 and 59.4.
² Throwing away the two extremes is also there. 46.1{52.4 and
56.0{57.8
² At age 65 is also there. 13.3{17.2 and 20.0{21.1.
² The interesting thing is that this is family income (so the man
earns is, ... typically).
² We do not know right now how separated these things are. We
will pursue this more.
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Health outcomes and economics (educ) are related
Various possibilities of why
1. Better education ! more income ! you buy better health.
2. Schooling develops di®erent tastes and attitudes.
3. Schooling allows to have better health.
4. Old age is relatively more enjoyable with more educ/money.
5. There is a (are) third variables(s) that in°uence both schooling
and health choices.
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Facts
² The relationship between health and schooling persists once we
control for income and other socio-economic variables Grossman (1973).
Therefore, hypo 1, insu±cient.
² A gradient of smoking behavior with years of schooling persists
(and is very strong) when smoking is measured at age 17, before
the later years of schooling are completed Farrell and Fuchs (1982).
Therefore, hypo 2 seems to be rejected.
² Kenkel (1991) shows that the relationship between smoking, drinking
and exercise habits and educ persists once we control for individuals
knowledge of their e®ects on health. Hence, hypo 3 bad.
² Hypos 4 and 5 point to health like earnings capability as human
capital. Their respective investments maybe complimentary.
² We will try to exploit individual level data on health outcomes,
wealth and education levels to learn about how to think about types
of people.
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Some related work
² A model of career and educational choice. Keane and Wolpin (1997)
(90% of di® in utils exist at 16).
² Heterogeneous time discount factors. Belzil and Hansen (1999) claim
that di® in ¯ is important to explain observed years of education,
wages and unemployment, and that discount rates are correlated
with ability (more able are more patient).
² Using the NLSY, Munasinghe and Sicherman (2000) show that non-
smokers self select into professions with higher wage growth.
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NLSY data
Yearly panel of (14-22 in 1979). There are complete data on
schooling, mental skills (di®erent tests), labor market behavior (hours
and hourly wages), income and wealth (including study loans and
scholarships), and demographic and family variables.
² Health at age 40. A series of questions on health (bmi, self rated
health, time spent in health care activities) after 40.
² Exercise habits (year 2000)
² Drug use: quantity and age of ¯rst consumption.
² Smoking.
² Sex and Criminal behavior.
² Use of time (1981). TV vs homework, work, etc.
² Data on wealth.
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HRS data
Panel since 1992 of born between 1931-41 and their spouses
regardless of age.
² Health status measures: there is an array of questions for
households to assess their health, from self rated health status to
perceived survival probabilities.
² Health investment: individuals are asked about their use of
medical services plus several questions on preventive behavior such
as prostate or breast cancer checks, preventive °u shots or cholesterol
checks. They are also asked about smoking and drinking behavior.
² Finally, there are the usual demographic and economic indicators:
age, sex, education, family structure, wealth and income.
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The Model: Exogenous Variables
First the types, constant for each type.
² Taste for health-related behavior z 2 Z
² Patience ¯
² Ability to earn ´
² Ability to learn µ (maybe also the Hugget-Ventura-Yaron ability
to learn).
Let ¿ = fz;¯;´g denote a subset of types.
Next the shocks
² Labor Earnings Shock ² with transition ¡²;²0.
² Shock to health ³ that a®ects (deteroriates) health, it is i.i.d.
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The Model: Preferences and Endogenous States
² Individuals live for a maximum of I periods.
² Within period ut fn, uz (c;y) (health investments).
² Health h evolves stochastically h0 = Ái(z;h;y)
² Health improves survival odds °ii = °i(h) (only need one i).
Education is chosen only in the ¯rst period. Health and Wealth are
updated. The endogenous state variables are
² Education e 2 E ´ fe1;e2;:::eneg Chosen when young.
² Wealth a 2 A ´ [a;1) updated every period.
² Health h 2 H ½ R+ updated every period.
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Agent's problem






with c + a0 = Ra + we´ ²
h0 = Ã (³;h;y)
Notice that the problem is not indexed by µ.
At i = 0, youth, individuals choose their education level e.
max
a0;y;e




with a yet to be determined current return W(:)
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Issues
MARRIAGE
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Solution
We solve the model to ¯nd the policy functions,
c = c¿
e;i(²;³;a;h) y = y¿
e;i(²;³;a;h).
The ¯rst order conditions are given by:
uz












The envelope conditions are V ¿;e;i
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The Cons Euler
The ¯rst Euler Eq is standard
uc(c;z) = uc(c) = R ¯ °i(h) E fuc(c0)g
² If uc = uc(c), then age pro¯les of c only di®er due to fh;²;¯g.
² If h is observable, with an estimation of the earnings process, the
age-pro¯les for c shows di®erebces ub time preferences, ¯. We need
a data set containing at the same time health status, income and
consumption (or wealth instead on cons).










² It is crucial to identify
1. the relationship between health investment and health stock
2. the predictive power of health stocks for survival probabilities.
With information on these two elements, di®erences in observed y
within individuals with same assets a, education e, earnings categories
² and ´ and patience ¯ will be accounted for di®erences in z.
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The Educational Choice
Finally, the optimality condition at youth that sorts out people in
di®erent educational categories will give us information on the ability
to learn or utility cost of education µ once we have already inferred
values for ¯, z and ´.
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Mapping the Model to Data
We needed to know (Possibly only one of them age dependent)
1. the relationship between health and harmful behavior, Ãi(h;y)
2. the survival probabilities at di®erent health levels °i(h).
HRS reports (self-rated health) and various measures of health
behavior. We use switching health category for those with good
health behavior and for those with bad health behavior.
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Targets for Identi¯cation of Types
1. We can use earnings analysis directly to get ´).
2. The positive correlation between education and health.
3. The Education Distribution given wage levels per generation.
(helps with µ).
4. Consumption Growth Rates (for ¯).
These variables have to be jointly observed.
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There are more targets to use
² After retirement earnings do not matter anymore, so conditional
on education, wealth and health (observables), variation in health
investment can only be due to variation in z (tolerance for care) or
variation in ¯ (patience). Alternatively, we can estimate jointly ¯
and z for retirees by looking at the variation in health investment
and in savings.
² Changes in assets a or earnings position ² should lead to changes
in health related behavior. Within an educational category, we can
look at changes in health related behavior y for those who experience
a change in either a or ² compared to those who do not experience
it.
² In a model including marriage there are many more sources of
data to exploit (although we may need go to PSID in this case). For
example, exogenous changes in fortune can be those of the spouse.
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Some descriptive statistics: preventive behavior
The HRS asks some questions that cover what we may call preventive
behavior: those actions or activities that the individual can take to
prevent mortal diseases. In what follows, I show data on the following:
² The respondent currently smokes, table 1.
² the respondent has checked his/her cholesterol level in the last
two years, table 2,
² the respondent has got a preventive °u shot in the last two years,
table 3 ,
² the respondent has made preventive checkings on gender-speci¯c
cancer risks, prostate for men and breast for women, in the last two
years, table 4
² the respondent does heavy physical activity (aerobics, running,
swimming, etc ... and heavy housework) at least three times per
week, table 5.
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Smoking behavior
Table 1 shows the proportion of smokers, men and women separately,
conditional on age education and marital status. Old people smoke
less which can also be used.
Table 1: Conditional means: currently smokes.
mar m sing m mar f sing f
edu=d 0.32 0.46 0.27 0.32
edu=h 0.21 0.36 0.18 0.27
edu=c 0.12 0.22 0.08 0.13
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Preventive cholesterol tests
The picture for cholesterol tests is the same as for smoking behavior.
More educated, married and women are more likely to take preventive
cholesterol tests. Age does not seem to be a signi¯cative factor.
Table 2: Conditional means: cholesterol checks in the last two years.
mar m sing m mar f sing f
edu=d 0.58 0.47 0.68 0.65
edu=h 0.71 0.59 0.73 0.69
edu=c 0.79 0.68 0.80 0.73
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Preventive °u shot
Again, we observe the same pattern in both the conditional means
but marital status does not seem to be signi¯cative.
Table 3: Conditional means: °u shot.
mar m sing m mar f sing f
edu=d 0.29 0.28 0.36 0.37
edu=h 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.36
edu=c 0.44 0.42 0.50 0.40
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Preventive tests for gender speci¯c cancer
Man are asked about prostrate checks in the last two years and
women about both mammogram in the last two years and regulars
self-checks on breasts.
Table 4: Conditional means: gender speci¯c cancer.
mar m sing m mar f sing f
edu=d 0.50 0.47 0.82 0.48
edu=h 0.67 0.58 0.89 0.52
edu=c 0.80 0.64 0.94 0.62
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Physical activity
This is the case were the standard pattern of preventive behavior is
not fully apparent. In particular, it is not true that college educated
individuals do more physical activity. However, the question is not
very good since it mixes sports activity with heavy housework.
Table 5: Conditional means: heavy physical activity.
mar m sing m mar f sing f
edu=d 0.54 0.44 0.46 0.36
edu=h 0.61 0.55 0.50 0.43
edu=c 0.55 0.47 0.55 0.48
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Conclusions
² We are after using the joint determination of earnings, education,
wealth and health to learn about ex ante heterogeneity of peoples.
² We have to think a lot more about of the details of the moments
of the data that we are using to restrict the model. We like to think
that we will work in the mold of Gustavo and Amir (and Huggett).
² We will extend this to account for marriage formation and sex.
We do not know yet how. We have done similar things before.
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